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My Way and/or the Highway: Exploring the "Adequacy" of
the Alternative Channels Test in Conditional Speech Cases
Justice D. Warren*
Drivers of the modern era can choose from a vast array of
vehicles, enjoying the ability to find the right color, body, and
features that best suit their personality. If that "perfect car" is not
out there, there is enough variety in the makes and models on the
road today that one can readily find a reasonable alternative to
"perfect." While we may take this for granted today, long ago there
were no such choices-there was . . . the Ford Model T.' And as

Henry Ford once famously stated: "Any customer can have a car
painted any colour he wants so long as it is black."2 This situation is
often described as a Hobson's choice, where one chooses between
one thing in its offered condition or nothing at all-the proverbial
"take it or leave it."3 The Hobson's choice Ford presented
customers helped make the Ford Motor Company a powerhouse in
the automotive industry. However, when the government presents
citizens or groups with a Hobson's choice, the "take it or leave it"
demand may be more problematic.
The government's ability to present individuals with a
Hobson's choice is constrained by the unconstitutional conditions

*Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2014.
1. See Model T, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/model-t
(last visited Mar. 13, 2013). Ford Motor Company's Model T revolutionized

the automotive industry, allowing millions of people to buy a car at an
affordable price. See id. The Model T dominated the automobile market in the
early twentieth century, accounting for almost 57% of the world's automobile
production by 1921. See Lon Tweeten & Andrea Ford, A Brief History Of:
The
Model
T,
TIME
(Sep.
24,
2008),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1844534,00.html.
2. HENRY FORD & SAMUEL CROWTHER, MY LIFE AND WORK 72 (1922).
Definition,
Dictionary.com,
Choice
3. Hobson's
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/hobson%27s+choice?s=t (last visited
Mar. 13, 2013).
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doctrine. 4 This doctrine prevents the government from offering a
benefit to an individual on the condition that she relinquish a
constitutional right in order to receive it.' The Supreme Court has
6
found such conditions to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court,
however, has not always viewed conditions on government benefits
as a Hobson's choice; in the context of restrictions on speech, the
condition may be constitutional if it leaves open adequate
alternative channels for expression. With this perspective, having
the black Model T or no Model T may not be the Hobson's choice
it first seemed -one could alternatively buy the black Model T and
subsequently take it to a body shop to get a candy red paint job.
While the adequacy of the alternative to paint a car need not be
grappled with here, the Court's determination of what alternative
channels for expression are "adequate" in any particular instance
has proven challenging to say the least, and has left lower courts
with little guidance as to how the adequate alternative channels test
is to be applied to conditional speech restrictions.8
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine often comes into
play when the government provides funding for nonprofit
organizations. The government will occasionally condition funding
to an organization by requiring that organization to remain silent or
to espouse a certain viewpoint.9 The government often does this
because it has an interest in seeing its funds spent in a way that
furthers its objectives."' Such is the case regarding a funding
provision of The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act ("Leadership Act")," the
constitutionality of which is currently before the Court as a result. 12
4. See infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
5. See id.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra notes 120-25, 133-35 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.

11. 22 U.S.C. § 7601-7682 (2006).
12. See DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT II), 477 F.3d
758, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting an unconstitutional conditions claim on the
basis that the government chose to fund a particular message and that the
plaintiffs were not compelled to adopt that message), with Alliance for Open
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Enacted to combat a global epidemic of communicable
diseases, the Leadership Act contains a provision ("the Policy
Requirement") stipulating that no funds are to be provided to any
organization without a "policy explicitly opposing prostitution and
sex trafficking."03 In DKT International, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for
InternationalDevelopmentl4 (DKT II), the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the Policy Requirement as constitutional, ruling
that it did not violate the nonprofit organization's First
Amendment rights." The same Policy Requirement was struck
down by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Alliance for
Open Society International v.

U.S.

Agency of International

Development6 (AOSI IV) as an unconstitutional infringement on
the organization's First Amendment right to free speech." The
Supreme Court has granted the government's petition for writ of
certiorari in the AOSI case, " and how the Court decides the case
will undoubtedly have major implications for government financiers
and nonprofit organizations.
In light of the Supreme Court's pending decision in the
AOSI case, this Note argues that the Court should use the
opportunity to add clarity to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, and, in particular, the adequate alternative channels test.
Part I provides a background on nonprofit associations in the
United States and their relationship with government. This Part
also examines the history and purpose of the Leadership Act. It
concludes by making a policy argument for strengthening the
speech protection for nonprofit organizations. Part 11 explores the
Supreme Court's legal framework for determining if a funding
condition is unconstitutional. It examines how the Court has
Soc'y Int'l v. U.S. Agency of Int'l Dev. (AOSI IV), 651 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir.
2011) (holding that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine applied where the
government affirmatively compelled plaintiffs' speech).
13. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006).
14. 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
15. Id. at 764.
16. 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011).
17. Id. at 223-24.
18. See AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218, cert.granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Jan.
11, 2013) (No. 12-10). Oral arguments were held on April 22, 2013.
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applied the adequate alternative channels test to conditional speech
restrictions, while noting that the Court has never explicitly defined
the test for such cases. Part III explores the various ways in which
federal courts have applied the Supreme Court's unconstitutional
conditions precedent to the Policy Requirement of the Leadership
Act. Part IV argues the need for the Supreme Court to explicitly
layout the framework of the adequate alternative channels test for
conditional speech restrictions by placing the burden on the
government to prove that alternative channels of communication
are adequate for the plaintiff organizations in each particular case.
This Part contends that the Supreme Court should adopt the AOSI
IV court's way of employing the adequate alternative channels test
to find the Policy Requirement unconstitutional.
I.

THE SOCIAL LANDSCAPE OF NONPROFIT

ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LEADERSHIP ACT
A. Nonprofits - Past,Present,and Government Partnerships
At the time of our nation's founding, philanthropic
organizations already served a crucial role in strengthening
American society and fostering a unique American identity." The
late professor Robert H. Bremner attributes the Native Americans
who greeted Christopher Columbus at his first landfall in the New
World as America's earliest philanthropists.20 Columbus reported
that these people freely gave away anything asked of them and gave
each gift "with as much love as if their hearts went with it."" The
Native Americans also served an indispensable role in assisting the
settlers in adjusting to the rigors of a new life in a foreign land.22
Many of the early settlers also came to the Americas with
19. See HOWARD S. MILLER, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
PHILANTHROPY 1776-1844 xi (1961) ("The law itself reflected a pragmatic
approach to the solving of social problems through philanthropy. Colonial
assemblies went out of their way to remove obstacles in the way of charities.").
20. ROBERT H. BREMNER, AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 5 (Daniel J.
Boorstin ed., 2d ed. 1988).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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philanthropic visions.23 The various churches established in the
colonies supported a variety of charitable institutions in recognition
of "the individual's responsibility for . . . the welfare of the

community." 24
Since those philanthropic visions took root in America, the
role of charitable organizations has only increased in prevalence
and importance. Today, the United States nonprofit sector
(sometimes referred to as the "voluntary sector" or the "third
sector") is made up of over 1.6 million organizations.2' Nonprofits
offer an avenue of desired change for minority groups whose
interests are not represented by the majoritarian government or in
the market. 26 In this way, nonprofits act as laboratories for
developing social strategies sometimes not yet identified by the
mainstream public. 27 Nonprofits therefore serve indispensable roles
in the functioning of healthy communities and promoting the
interests and welfare of many citizens.28
These general qualities of nonprofit organizations are no
less true for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) relief
23. See id. at 6-7 ("It is not too much to say that many Europeans
regarded the American continent mainly as a vastly expanded field for the
exercise of benevolence.").
24. MILLER, supra note 19, at x.
25. AMY S. BLACKWOOD, KATIE L. ROEGER, & SARAH L. PETTIJOHN,
URBAN INSTITUTE, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES,
GIVING,
AND
VOLUNTEERING,
2012
(2012),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412674-The-Nonprofit-Sector-inBrief.pdf.
26. See LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
PRIMER 13 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that greater heterogeneity in a population is
likely to mean a larger nonprofit sector).
27. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 122 (John
Gray ed. 1912) (1859) ("Government operations tend to be everywhere alike.

With individuals and voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied
experiments, and endless diversity of experience.").
28. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 599
(Penguin Classics ed. 2003) (1835) ("In the United States, as soon as several
inhabitants have taken an opinion or an idea they wish to promote in society,
they seek each other out and unite together once they have made contact.
From that moment, they are no longer isolated but have become a power seen
from afar whose activities serve as an example and whose words are
heeded.").
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organizations, though their beginnings can be traced to a much
more recent past. The name for this disease was coined in 1982,
after hundreds of thousands of people worldwide had been infected
by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). 29 By the early 1980s,
a number of AIDS relief organizations sprung up in the United
States, including the San Francisco AIDS Foundation, AIDS
Project Los Angeles, and Gay Men's Health Crisis.30 These
organizations formed because of the gay and lesbian community's
outrage at the government's lack of response to the epidemic." The
nonprofits were primarily designed to educate people about the
disease and to advocate for improved medical research and
treatment. 32 In 1986, the U.S. Surgeon General published its Report
on AIDS, marking the government's first major statement on what
the nation should do to prevent the spread of AIDS.
As was the case with AIDS relief groups in the 1980s,
nonprofit organizations often respond to pressing issues that have
not yet been addressed by the government.34 Even if the
government has responded, it will often enlist nonprofits to deliver
additional services that it finances for efficiency reasons. 35 The
government has increasingly turned to nonprofit organizations to
provide for delivery of most publicly financed services, and in so
doing it has become the most important source of income for most
36
charitable nonprofit organizations. Today, government funds
29. History of AIDS up to 1986, AVERT.ORG, http://www.avert.org/aidshistory-86.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
30. Id.
31. See Debra C. Minkoff & Walter W. Powell, Nonprofit Mission:
Constancy, Responsiveness, or Deflection?, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK 591, 596 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds.,
2d ed. 2006).
32. See id.
33. See History of AIDS up to 1986, supra note 29.
34. See SALAMON, supra note 26, at 11-13.
35. See id. at 13 (stating that there is "often a preference for some
nongovernmental mechanism to deliver services and respond to public needs
because of the cumbersomeness, unresponsiveness, and bureaucratization that
often accompanies governmental action").
36. See STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR
HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING 4 (1993) ("Rather
than relying mostly on private charity and volunteers, most nonprofit service

642

FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 11I

account for nearly a third of nonprofit organizations' revenue, twice
as much as all sources of private funding combined.3 7 Thus, as
dependent as the government is on the nonprofit sector for
assistance with public service, the nonprofit sector is equally
dependent on government to make public service works possible. 8
The government-nonprofit relationship is not without
conflict, as evidenced by the lawsuits brought by AIDS relief
organizations challenging the constitutionality of the Leadership
Act.3 The government, in providing financial resources, has an
interest in ensuring that its funding is used in a way that is
consistent with the government's objectives.40 Conversely,
nonprofits, by accepting funding from the government, run the risk
of losing their independence or distorting their missions by
following the money.4 1 When a nonprofit's interests conflict with a
organizations depend on government support for over half of their revenues:
for many, government support comprises their entire budget. In contrast to
the traditional image of government and nonprofits as two independent
sectors, the new relationship amounts to one of mutual dependence.").
37. See THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, NONPROFIT SECTOR STRATEGY GROUP,
THE
NONPROFIT
RELATIONSHIP

SECTOR

AND

GOVERNMENT:

CLARIFYING

THE

at
2002),
available
8
(Winter
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/NPGOVERNM
ENT.PDF.
38. For a look into how inadequate government funding has had a
profound effect on both nonprofit organizations and the general public, see
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, COSTS, COMPLEXIFICATION, AND
CRISIS: GOVERNMENT'S HUMAN SERVICES CONTRACTING "SYSTEM" HURTS
available
at
(Oct.
7,
2010),
EVERYONE

http://www.govtcontracting.org/sites/default/files/Costs%20Complexification
%20and%2OCrisis.pdf.
39. See Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l v. U.S. Agency of Int'l Dev., 651
F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, - U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013); DKT
Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
40. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995) ("When the government disburses public funds to private
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by
the grantee.").
41. See Lester M. Salamon, Partnersin Public Service.- The Scope and
Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK 114, 116 (Walter W. Powell, ed. 1987).
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government financier, it may face an identity crisis: align with the
objectives of the government entity and start down the path of
altering the mission of the nonprofit, or stay true to its mission and
jeopardize the receipt of government funds and consequently the
success of the programs for which government funding is needed.42
Regardless of how a nonprofit elects to resolve this dilemma, it is
forced to weigh the choice of compromising its ultimate goals.
B. The Policy Basis for Respecting Nonprofit Organizations'
Speech Autonomy

Nonprofit organizations serve an important function in our
democracy as a vehicle for individuals to come together and
participate in civil society and affect government policy. 43 The
heterogeneity of U.S. society makes the nonprofit sector all the
more vital, as the sector provides diverse decision-making method
regarding what public benefits to provide.4 While Congress, as an
elected body, is accountable to, and representative of, the
majority,45 nonprofits are not bound by the same restraints, and can
exercise more innovation and experimentation to produce
secondary benefits falling outside the scope of those demanded by
the majority.46
In addition to providing a diverse range of public benefits,
nonprofit organizations also bring diverse viewpoints. The
majority's view of what constitutes the public good rightfully should
42. See Minkoff & Powell, supra note 31, at 594 ("[T]he need for external
legitimacy and survival tends to provide incentives for groups to compromise
the missions that may have originally motivated them.

. .

. [N]onprofits face a

choice between taking a more cautious or conservative interpretation of their
mission versus pursuing a more flexible or innovative orientation.").
43. See generally TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 28 (arguing that American
democracy rests on the strength and influence of voluntary associations).
44. See John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable
Organizations,in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267,
275 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
45. See Minkoff & Powell, supra note 31, at 591 ("Government provision
of goods and services is typically targeted to the mainstream, to a stylized
median voter.").
46. See Simon et al., supra note 44, at 274.
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be given strong consideration when policy decisions are made. Yet
views of what constitutes the public good are often subjective, and
the majority's view inevitably shifts overtime. 47 For these reasons, it
is important that the views of the minority are not disregarded.
One view of the public good holds that the public interest is
not any particular viewpoint, but rather a set of procedures for
ensuring a competitive process for all relevant interests to be
represented. 48 This view supports a stronger democracy by allowing
for more civic engagement through nonprofit advocacy, ensuring a
broader representation of interests.4 9
Minority groups tend to show a strong allegiance to
nonprofit organizations whose missions are tailored to address the
concerns of those groups.so In order for nonprofits to enjoy the
continued allegiance of those groups, it is critical for them to show a
continued commitment to their missions."
Complicating a nonprofit's ability to adhere to its mission is
the fact that the organizational structure of nonprofit organizations
constrains the way in which these groups can generate funds.52 In
addition to receiving tax-exempt status from the government,
nonprofits are also heavily dependent on funding from government
sources.53 Because of their dependence on government support,
nonprofit organizations are vulnerable to political efforts to
47. See J. Craig Jenkins, Nonprofit Organizationsand PoliticalAdvocacy,
in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 307, 308 (Walter W.
Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) ("Interests are diverse and
inherently subjective. One person's 'public good' may be another's 'public
bad.' Those who claim to speak in the name of the general public can claim no
privileged insight.").
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Minkoff & Powell, supra note 31, at 591.
51. See id.
52. There are many legal barriers to how nonprofit organizations can
raise and spend money, including limits on charitable solicitation, unrelated
business activity, and substantial lobbying, to name a few. See generally Evelyn
Brody, The Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 243 (Walter W. Powell & Richard

Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (explaining the structure of and legal restrictions

on non-profit organizations).
53. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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leverage this support to limit the groups' advocacy efforts-or in
the case of the Policy Requirement, to encourage advocacy of
54
government views.
Such is the dilemma AIDS relief organizations like DKT
International ("DKT") and Alliance for Open Society Internation
("AOSI") face. Amicus curiae, in a memorandum in support of
ASOI in AOSI 1, explained the problems with accepting funding
under the Leadership Act:
Compelling NGOs to adopt a policy statement
opposing prostitution impedes their ability to
reach out to sex workers, to teach them skills
that would make it possible for them to leave
prostitution, to promote safer sex practices
among sex workers and their clients, to provide
medical treatment and care for HIV-positive
sex workers and their families, and to engage in
further research into effective practices for
preventing the spread of HIV.
In 2000, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS) conducted a case study on HIV prevention projects for
female sex workers, which stated that "most mainstream societies
have relegated [sex workers] to the margins, abused them,
exploited them[,] and restricted their rights as citizens." 56 However,
sex workers have found an ally in AIDS relief organizations, who
54. See Elizabeth S. Clemens, The Constitution of Citizens: Political
Theories of Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK 207, 214 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds.,
2d ed. 2006) (detailing the influence of government in partnerships with
nonprofit organizations).
55. Memorandum of Law of AIDS Action et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 13, Alliance for
Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev. (AOSI 1), 430 F.
Supp. 2d 222, (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 05-cv-8209), 2005 WL 3655009 [hereinafter
Amici Curiae].
56. UNAIDS, FEMALE SEX WORKER HIV PREVENTION PROJECTS:
LESSONS LEARNT FROM PAPUA NEw GUINEA, INDIA AND BANGLADESH 9

(Nov. 2000), available at http://data.unaids.org/publications/IRC-pub05/jc438femsexwork
en.pdf.
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have established trust with the sex worker population in order to
effectively help them, and, in turn, benefit populations at risk of
contracting HIV/AIDS.57 In view of the importance that trust plays
in this relationship, "[i]t is folly to suggest that successful programs
could possibly maintain their relationship with sex workers if they
advocated for their continued criminalization, arrest and
prosecution."
The counterargument to these policy arguments suggests
that there are some groups for which the government clearly should
not provide benefits, as these groups may promote hostility or
antidemocratic values.5 Groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, neoNazis, and other similar groups come are examples in support of
this point. This counterargument suggests that the government
should be able to condition benefits based on the organization's
speech so that such disfavored viewpoints do not spread because of
government subsidies.
However, the answer to this issue of disfavored viewpoints
need not, and should not, come in the form of the government
conditioning funds on an organization's refrain from, or
engagement in, protected speech. Instead, the solution can be found
in the Supreme Court case of Bob Jones University v. United
Statesi 0 In Bob Jones, two nonprofit private schools that enforced
57. See Amici Curiae, supra note 55, at 17-18.
58. Id. at 20 (quoting Penelope Sanders, ProhibitingSex Work Projects,
Restricting Women's Rights: The InternationalImpact of the 2003 U.S. Global
AIDS Act, 7 HEALTH & HUM. RTS.: AN INT'L J. 179, 187 (2004)) (emphasis
omitted). But see United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and MalariaAct of 2003: Markup on H.R. 1298 Before the H. Comm. On Int'l
Relations, 108th Cong. 92, 149 (2003) [hereinafter Leadership Act Markup] ("I
believe that the United States should do everything within its power to combat
and eliminate human trafficking and prostitution. By doing so, we will most
certainly, as a direct consequence, mitigate the spread of HIV/AIDS.")
(statement of Representative Christopher Smith, Vice Chairman, House
Committee On International Relations).
59. See Clemens, supra note 54, at 211-12 ("To what extent can a
democracy tolerate-much less encourage-associations that cultivate
divisiveness and intolerance among citizens? This is a central debate among
theorists of liberalism . .. and one that signals the dangers of assuming that all
associational participation nurtures civic skills and values.").
60. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).

2013]1

ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS TEST

647

racially discriminatory admissions standards challenged the denial
of their tax-exempt status.6 The schools argued that institutions
would be entitled to § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status if they qualified
under one of the categories specified in the statute, which included
institutions formed for "educational" purposes.62
In upholding the denial of tax-exempt status, the Court
determined that Congress had meant to incorporate the common
law concept of "charity" into § 501(c)(3) . While noting the danger
associated with the IRS and the courts using their judgment to
determine whether a nonprofit's activities are considered
"charitable," the Bob Jones Court ruled that the schools'
discriminatory policies were adverse to the public good and
therefore fundamentally opposed to the meaning of "charity."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Lewis Powell expressed a
reticence to subscribe to the Court's interpretation of the statute,
stating that this view "ignores the important role played by tax
exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply
conflicting, activities and viewpoints."" While Justice Powell's fears
were certainly warranted, the years following the Bob Jones
decision have shown that the IRS will limit the denial of tax exempt
status only to violations of clearly established policy. 66 The
aftermath of the Bob Jones decision reveals that the government
does have a way in which it can choose not to support an
organization by revoking its nonprofit status. However, the Bob
Jones opinion suggests that policy considerations warrant the
government's revocation of benefits for nonprofit organizations
only in certain limited instances, and that absent such instances it is
not within the province of the government to use its spending
61. Id. at 577.
62. Id. at 585-86.
63. Id. at 586-88.
64. Id. at 592 ("[A] declaration that a given institution is not 'charitable'
should be made only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved is
contrary to a fundamental public policy. But there can no longer be any doubt
that racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted
views of elementary justice.").
65. Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring).
66. See Simon et. al., supra note 44, at 280.
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power to influence public debate through the speech of
67
nonprofits.
While one could argue that advocating for the legalization
of prostitution and human sex trafficking runs counter to clearly
established public policy, and therefore, under the rationale of Bob
Jones, the government could deny benefits to organizations that
engage in such advocacy, it is much more difficult to suggest that an
organization who takes no stance on the issue of legal prostitution
is similarly situated to one who does take such a stance. To the
contrary, reasoned arguments have been made for why the public
interest is best served by AIDS relief organizations remaining
neutral on the issue of prostitution and sex trafficking. 6' Given the
strength of these arguments, public policy commands that the
government should not attempt to drive out certain viewpoints on
the issue through its spending power.
67. See generally David A. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice,
and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights Laws to Apply to TaxExempt Charities, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REv. 167, 186-91 (2001) (arguing that the
"public policy limitation" of Bob Jones provides inadequate protection of civil
rights).
68. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. See also David M.
Ullian, Note and Comment, "Well Beyond" Permissible: How Severing the
Leadership Act's Policy Requirement Affirms Our Commitment to First
Amendment Values, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 713, 736 (2012) ("Reasonable minds
can differ about the propriety of prostitution.... By compelling opposition to
prostitution and prohibiting all activities that are inconsistent with such a
stance, the Policy Requirement restricts full and free discussion on the public
issue and is therefore unconstitutional.").
69. But see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978,

1017-18 (2011) (arguing that government-sponsored community groups,

"which are necessarily under heavy state influence, cannot play the kind of
independent role in self-governance - including in forming values free of state
interference and in overseeing and petitioning public officials - that the First
Amendment envisions"). Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat's conclusion invites
far-reaching implications for the speech rights of associations that rely on
government funding because Bhagwat does not delineate what constitutes a
"government-sponsored community group" undeserving of full First
Amendment protection. See Frances R. Hill, Speaking Truth to the Power that
Funds Them: A Jurisprudence of Association for Advocacy Organizations
Financially Dependent on Government Grants and Contracts, 15 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 363, 365 (2012) ("While this analysis may apply to some
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One may argue, though, that the government is entitled to
spend its money as it sees fit. If the government wants to condition
a benefit on an organization relinquishing its free speech rights, it
should be within the government's power to do so, as that
organization will be no worse off than it was before the government
benefit was offered. As such, the organization has not been
deprived of anything, but rather has been given a choice as to
whether it wants to be better off by accepting the benefit.7 0 It is only
when the individual is truly coerced by the government, e.g., by
threatening to revoke a pre-existing benefit, that a court should
apply heightened scrutiny.71
This argument, while persuasive, fails to fully capture the
dynamic between government and the beneficiary. In her 1989
Article Unconstitutional Conditions, Professor Kathleen Sullivan
offers an opposing argument based on a different perspective of the
organizations, its general acceptance as a principle of the jurisprudence of
association would have such broad application and such fundamental
implications in contemporary circumstances that a very large share of
associations would fall outside the jurisprudence of association. Limiting the
First Amendment to self-financing organizations would impoverish the
concept of association and impede the analysis of the roles of associations in
an era of government outsourcing.").
70. In their article Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN.
L. REv. 543 (1996), Martin H. Redish and Daryl I. Kessler analyze this logic,
which they say is based on two premises:
First, by definition, a governmental subsidy is a matter of
governmental largesse, and the greater governmental
power to deny the subsidy logically includes the lesser
power to grant the subsidy conditionally on the waiver of
a constitutional right. Second, if the individual chooses to
exercise her right of speech rather than receive the
subsidy, she is in no worse a position than if the
government had offered her no subsidy in the first place.
Id. at 549.
71. See Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l v. U.S. Agency of Int'l Dev. (AOSI
IVI), 651 F.3d 218, 246 (2d Cir. 2011) (Straub, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
funding condition would be unconstitutional as a coercive penalty on the
exercise of First Amendment rights "if it denied government benefits to which
the recipient would otherwise be entitled and that are independent from those
provided by the government program at issue (for example, by denying a
property tax exemption for failure to take a loyalty oath)").
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72

government-beneficiary dynamic. Sullivan contends that strict
scrutiny should apply any time the government offers a conditional
benefit with the purpose or effect of pressuring recipients to alter a
choice about exercise of a protected right in a direction favored by
the government.73 Sullivan argues, inter alia, that courts have
wrongly applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by looking
at the coerciveness of the condition on the individual.74 Instead,
courts would do better to focus on the systemic effects that
conditions on benefits have on the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.7' This is because, from the individual's perspective,
a government benefit is something to which the beneficiary is not
entitled, but is instead a product of government largesse; from a
systemic view, however, government benefits are not handouts, but
rather a redistribution of the wealth originally given to the
government by the tax-paying public.76
Redistribution of wealth is an essential function of
government, as it results in the building of infrastructure, providing
education, serving the needy, defending the country, and
responding to disasters. While the people of the United States allow
the government to redistribute wealth in many ways, normally
subject to only minimal scrutiny,77 the people do not allow the
distribution of power to be determined along the lines of
relinquishing a constitutional right.78 This view supports the idea
72. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413 (1989).
73. See id. at 1499-1500.

74. Id. at 1490 (arguing that "coercion theory focuses too narrowly on the
individual beneficiary...").
75. Id.at 1490.
76. Id.at 1490 ("Such an approach starts from the proposition that the
preferred constitutional liberties at stake in unconstitutional conditions cases
do not simply protect individual rightholders piecemeal. Instead, they also
help determine the overall distribution of power between government and
rightholders generally, and among classes of rightholders.").
77. Id.at 1425 ("Such gratuities, like all government action, must satisfy
at least a requirement of minimal rationality.").
78. See id. at 1497 ("Wherever obligations of government
evenhandedness are central to a right . . . conditions on a benefit designed to

prefer one otherwise constitutionally protected choice to another will pose a
danger.").
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that all individuals in the United States have paid into a system
designed to uphold certain liberties, and that the government
cannot then use those payments to buy out individual liberties. 9
The rights secured by the Constitution for AIDS relief
organizations and other charitable nonprofits is vital because,
without them, the ways in which these organizations may go about
bringing positive change in the world could be sharply
circumscribed8 Nonprofit organizations are so important for the
very reason that they are not the government - they can address
issues that the government will not or in ways in which the
government is unable.8 ' With nonprofits as dependent on
government funding as they have become," civil liberties are the
primary force repelling an amalgamation of nonprofits and
government.
C. The History and Purposeof the LeadershipAct
The report released by UNAIDS in 200 estimated that 34.3
million people worldwide were afflicted with HIV/AIDS at the turn
of the millennium.83 In 1999 alone, there were an estimated 2.8
million deaths from AIDS and 5.4 million people were newly
infected with HIV.Y These staggering numbers continued to climb,
with, according to a Congressional finding, an estimated 42 million
people across the globe infected with HIV/AIDS by then end of
2002.5 In his 2003 State of the Union address, President George W.
79. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964) (noting how government largesse from accumulated tax dollars has
created increased dependency on government, and arguing that the
government can use that largesse to buy up people's liberties).
80. See SMITH & LIPSKY, supra note 36, at 182-83 (noting the ways in
which the government has attempted to limit nonprofit advocacy).
81. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
83. UNAIDS, REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC 6 (June
2000), available at https://www.unaids.org/en/medialunaids/contentassets
/dataimport/pub/report/2000/2000_gr.en.pdf.
84. Id.
85. 22 U.S.C. § 7601 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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Bush urged Congress to address the global AIDS epidemic by
pledging $15 billion to fight the disease.8 The 108th Congress
promptly responded by enacting The Leadership Act of 2003,
which granted billions in aid to U.S. and international nonprofit
organizations and foreign governments to fight HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria.Y Congress' stated purpose of the Act "is
to strengthen and enhance United States leadership and the
effectiveness of the United States response to the HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria pandemics and other related and
preventable infectious diseases as part of the overall United States
health and development agenda." 8 Notably absent from the
statutory statement of purpose is any mention of prostitution or sex
trafficking."
In April 2003, the House Committee on International
Relations voted to add two prostitution-related conditions to the
receipt of funding in the original text of the bill." The first, §
7631(e), mandates that no funds granted under the Act be used to
''promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or

86. See George W. Bush, President of the United States of America,
Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 82, 85 (Jan. 28, 2003).
87. Pub. L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601 to
7682 (2006)). While the Act's focus on tuberculosis and malaria has not
received much attention in the cases in which the Act has been challenged,
these diseases continue to have a very real effect worldwide. Malaria is
estimated to infect 350 to 500 million people each year, killing one million. See
Malaria, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/health/indexmalaria.html
(last
updated May 25, 2012). Tuberculosis is just as prevalent and deadly, with onethird of the world's population infected with TB, resulting in 1.4 million deaths
in 2011. See
Tuberculosis (TB)
Data and Statistics, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/tb/statistics/default.htm (last updated Sep. 26, 2012). TB is
also a leading killer of people who are infected with HIV. See id.
88. 22 U.S.C. § 7603 (2006).
89. See id.
90. United States Leadership Against HIVIAIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria Act of 2003: Markup on H.R. 1298 Before the H. Comm. On Int'l
Relations, 108th Cong. 92, 97 (2003) [hereinafter Leadership Act Markup].
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sex trafficking." 91 The second condition, § 7631(f), the one at issue
in the most recent circuit court opinions,9 states:
No funds made available to carry out this Act,
or any amendment made by this Act, may be
used to provide assistance to any group or
organization that does not have a policy
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex
trafficking, except that this subsection shall not
apply to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Health
Organization, the International AIDS Vaccine
Initiative or to any United Nations agency. 93
This section, known as the Policy Requirement, was introduced by
Representative Christopher Smith of New Jersey. 94 Representative
Smith highlighted troubling facts about the prostitution industry
and stressed that it must be the policy of the United States to deny
funding to organizations that believe prostitution and sex
trafficking are legitimate industries.9 5 Representative Smith's
comments to the Committee focused more on the eradication of
prostitution and sex trafficking rather than on how best to fight
HIV/AIDS. 96
91. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (2006). This amendment to the original bill was
introduced by Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House Committee
On International Relations, and approved by the Committee on International
Relations. Leadership Act Markup, supra note 90, at 92, 97.
92. See generally Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l v. U.S. Agency of Int'l
Dev. (A OSI IV), 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, _ U.S. _, 133 S.
Ct. 928 (2013); DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT I), 477

F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
93. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006).
94. Leadership Act Markup, supra note 90, at 148 (statement of
Representative Christopher Smith, Vice Chairman, House Committee On
International Relations).
95. Id. at 148-49.
96. This is reflected in the way in which Representative Smith presented
the issue before the Committee:
The issue that is before us today is whether or not we will
provide money to organizations that seek the legalization
of prostitution and also enable the traffickers, and stand
side by side with the traffickers and, regrettably, enable
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It was initially unclear what effect the Policy Requirement
would have on nonprofit organizations. 97 At first, the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) did not apply the Policy
Requirement to American-based nonprofits because the U.S.
Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) had
determined that "the organization-wide restrictions, which would
prevent or require certain advocacy or positions in activities
completely separate from the federally funded programs . .. cannot

be constitutionally applied to U.S. organizations."9 '
After the OLC later withdrew its determination, USAID
issued a directive stating that, "as a condition of entering into this
agreement or any subagreement, a non-governmental organization
or public international organization recipient/subrecipient must
have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking." 99
Organizations that felt their missions, and thus free speech rights,
would be compromised by being forced to advocate against

them to enslave these women, whether or not we will
provide the money to them.
Id. at 149. Representative Smith did state that "I believe that the United
States should do everything within its power to combat and eliminate human
trafficking and prostitution. By doing so, we will most certainly, as a direct
consequence, mitigate the spread of HIV/AIDS." Id. However, there is
nothing else in his comments that suggest the goal of his amendment was to
mitigate the spread of HIV/AIDS, and he offered no support for his
conclusion that such mitigation would occur. See id. at 148-49.
97. See AOSIIV, 651 F.3d at 225.
98. Memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel on the Constitutionally Permissible Funding Restrictions for Sex
Trafficking
and
HIV/AIDS
Prevention,
available
at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/2fdb4d2e5c42284e0a-fcm6bxtl3.pdf. After a drawn
out battle in court, the OLC was recently required to make public a copy of
this memo. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law v. U.S.
DOJ, 697 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2012).
99. OFFICE OF ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE, USAID, AAPD No. 05-04,
IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE U.S.
LEADERSHIP AGAINST
HIV/AIDS,
TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003 - ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON
THE USE OF FUNDS AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX

TRAFFICKING

5

(June

9,

2005),

available

http://transition.usaid.gov/business/business-opportunities/cib/pdf/aapd05_04.
pdf.

at
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prostitution, challenged the Policy Requirement soon after it was
implemented.'oo
II. ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS AND THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE

In limited circumstances, Congress can limit speech by
attaching conditions to the receipt of government funds, requiring
the recipient to refrain from or engage in certain speech. Congress
is able to attach conditions to funds pursuant to its spending
power.o' The Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that
"Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States."' 02
Despite the fact that "the Constitution created a Federal
Government of limited powers,"03 the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Spending Clause, in combination with the
Necessary and Proper Clause, as conferring broad power on
Congress to appropriate funds.' 5 Congress' power of the purse
100. See DKT Int'l v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT 1), 435 F. Supp.
2d 5 (D.D.C. 2006); Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l
Dev. (A OSI1), 430 F. Supp. 2d 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
101. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) ("Incident to
this [spending] power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of
federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power to further broad policy
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the
recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
103. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
104. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. ("The Congress shall have Power ...
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.").
105. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) ("The
Court's broad construction of Congress' power under the Commerce and
Spending Clauses has of course been guided, as it has with respect to
Congress' power generally, by the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause
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gives it the ability to both collect taxes (and grant tax exemptions)
and spend the revenues of those taxes.10
Congress will often use its spending power to deter
disfavored outcomes or encourage desirable outcomes by attaching
conditions to a government benefit, such as conditioning the receipt
of federal highway funds to states on setting the minimum legal
drinking age at twenty-one. ' When Congress conditions the
receipt of a government benefit, the Supreme Court has required
that the condition further the general welfare, that it be
unambiguous, and that it be related to the reason the funds are
being given."o Moreover, if Congress places a condition on a
government benefit, and that condition implicates another
provision of the Constitution, the provision may act as an
independent bar to Congress's spending power."9
When Congress conditions the receipt of a government
benefit on a speech restriction, the Supreme Court has afforded a
remedy for recipients through the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.o Under this doctrine, the government cannot condition a
benefit by requiring that an individual relinquish a constitutionally
protected right, nor can the government deny a benefit for
exercising a constitutional right."' The Court has long applied this
doctrine to safeguard the right of organizations to receive benefits
from the government without being deprived of their constitutional
right to free speech." 2 As applied to First Amendment protections,
106. Although the Constitution does not explicitly authorize Congress to

spend, the power has generally been understood as an implied extension of the
power to tax. For an argument that the Constitution was not meant to give
Congress the power to spend, see generally Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending
Clause? (or The President's Paramour): An Examination of the Views of
Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article 1, Section 8, Clause I of the United
States Constitution,33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1999).
107. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).

108. Id. at 207.
109. Id. at 208.
110. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1009 (4th ed. 2011).
111. Id.

112. See Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926) ("If the
state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its
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the unconstitutional conditions doctrine "holds that the
government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech even

if he has no entitlement to that benefit.""' Benefits that are
implicated in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine are those that
the government is permitted, but not compelled, to provide.1 14
A straightforward reading of this doctrine suggests that it
applies anytime a condition forces an individual to choose between
receiving a government benefit and exercising their right to
freedom of speech.' 5 In practice, however, whether the Court will
find a restriction to be an unconstitutional condition has depended
greatly on how the issue was framed.' 16 In the cases in which the
Court has treated the condition as a penalty on speech, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine has applied."'7 But when the
condition has been treated as a decision by the government to not
subsidize speech, the restriction has not been deemed an
unconstitutional condition and has been upheld."' There is no clear
indication of when a condition is considered a "penalty" and when
it is considered a "non-subsidy."ll 9

favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that
guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be
manipulated out of existence."); S. Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 207
(1892) ("[T]hat statute, requiring the corporation, as a condition precedent to
obtaining a permit to do business within the State, to surrender a right and
privilege secured to it by the Constitution and laws of the United States, was
unconstitutional and void. . . ."); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186, 200 (1887)
("[The Supreme Court] has uniformly asserted that no conditions can be
imposed by the state which are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the
United States").
113. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
114. See Sullivan, supra note 72, at 1422.
115. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 570 (discussing how the
Supreme Court has been inconsistent in adhering to the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine).
116. See id.
117. See infra Part II.B.
11& See infra Part II.A.

119. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky suggests the possibility that "the decisions
simply turn on the views of the Justices in particular cases." CHEMERINSKY,
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The Supreme Court does not, however, end its analysis once
it has determined whether a condition is a penalty or a non-subsidy.
The Court then also considers whether the recipient is afforded an
alternative channel of communication for protected expression.'2 0
The Court has yet to define this test for conditional speech
restrictions, and whether an alternative channel exists has not
proven determinative to the outcome of such a case.1
However, the Supreme Court has clearly defined an
adequate alternative channels test for cases involving speech
restrictions in certain locations or forums.122 The Court has been
more willing to allow restrictions of speech on certain property, as
opposed to restrictions on the speaker, out of recognition for the
government's need to balance freedom of speech with the need to
minimize disruption of public places.'23 The adequate alternative
supra note 110, at 1013. "If the Court wishes to strike down a condition, it
declares it to be an unconstitutional condition; if the Court wishes to uphold a
condition, it declares that the government is making a permissible choice to
subsidize some activities and not others." Id. Cf Edward T. Chaney, Note and
Recent Development, Velazquez v. Legal Services Corporation:
Unconstitutional Conditions and First Amendment Rights of Nonprofit
Organizationsand Their Donors, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 267, 280-81 (2006)
(positing two interpretations of the Court's conditional speech cases: first, that
there exists a strict dichotomy between unconstitutional conditions and
permissible non-subsidies; and second, that when a condition is not deemed a
permissible non-subsidy, the Court will then apply heightened scrutiny).
120. See infra Parts II.A-B.
121. But cf Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l v. U.S. Agency of Int'l Dev.
(AOSI 1), 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 261-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he Supreme
Court's reliance in both Rust and Regan on the availability of alternate
channels for grant recipients' First Amendment activity as a basis for
upholding the challenged provisions in each of those cases is strongly
persuasive here."). In FCC v. League of Women Voters, 648 U.S. 384 (1984),
discussed infra Part II.B, the Court did state in dicta that the presence of
alternative channels would have allowed the condition to be upheld. Id. at 400.
122. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994); Clark v. Cmty for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Members of City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S.
640, 648 (1981); Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535
(1980).
123. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 1171.
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channels test for forum doctrine was explicitly stated for the first
time in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens

Consumer Council,124 where the Supreme Court noted that it has
often upheld reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech "provided that they are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant
governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information."l25

As forum doctrine has developed, a time, place, or manner
restriction must satisfy four elements in order to be upheld. The
first element looks to whether the restriction is content-neutral or
content-based. In order for a law to be considered content-neutral,
it must be both viewpoint-neutral (not based on the ideology of the
message) and subject-matter neutral (not based on the topic of the
speech). 12 6 If the restriction is found to be content-neutral, the court
will apply intermediate scrutiny. 127 "Intermediate" and "strict"I28
scrutiny are both forms of heightened scrutiny, in which the burden
of proof is on the government to show that its actions are
constitutional.129 A law will survive intermediate scrutiny if it
124. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
125. Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
126. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 962. Though the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral laws is relevant to the holding of
AOSI IV, this Note does not focus its full attention on this distinction. For a
thorough discussion of the distinction between content-based and contentneutral laws, see id.at 960-69.
127. See id. at 961.
128. Laws subjected to strict scrutiny "are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.",
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). The Supreme Court
has very rarely found laws to pass the strict scrutiny test, and as a result the
test has been described as "strict in theory but fatal in fact." See Gerald
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). However,

the Court has been hesitant to apply strict scrutiny to conditional speech
restrictions, see infra Parts II.A, B, and for that reason the analysis in this Note
proceeds on the assumption that, when the Court applies heightened scrutiny,
it will more closely resemble intermediate scrutiny.
129. See Russell W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American
Constitutional Law, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 453 (1988) (describing
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"serve[s] important governmental objectives and [is] substantially
related to [the] achievement of those objectives.""o The
requirement that the law be "substantially related" is also
sometimes referred to as the "narrow-tailoring" requirement. 3 ' The
restriction will meet the narrow tailoring requirement if it
''promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation."1 2
If the important government interest and narrow tailoring
elements are satisfied, the time, place, or manner restriction must
still leave open adequate alternative channels for expression in
order to be upheld. This additional element ensures that the
speaker will maintain effective communicative opportunities
elsewhere or through another medium.3 This approach stems from
the belief that the conveyance of the message is often more
important than the mode of expression. 34 The Court has not
applied a bright-line rule for determining whether an alternative
channel for expression will be considered "ample" or "adequate" -

heightened scrutiny as a "more aggressive, less deferential type of judicial
review than rationality review," which "involve[s] a presumption of
unconstitutionality and put the burden on the government").
130. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
131. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989)
("[A] regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be
narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral
interests . . . ."). The Virginia Pharmacy Court did not state this part of the test

in its opinion, but the omission may have been inadvertent. See Elisabeth
Alden Langworthy, Note, Time, Place, or Manner Restrictions on Commercial
Speech, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 127, 135 n.47 (1983). The Supreme Court has

also merged the narrow tailoring requirement and the adequate alternative
channels requirement into one part of the standard. See Susan H. Williams,
Content Discriminationand the FirstAmendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 642
(1991).

132 Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 799 (internal quotations omitted).
133. William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the
Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of
Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 757, 799 (1986).

134. Id.
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instead, the Court has made this determination on a case-by-case
basis."'
For example, in Heffron v. InternationalSociety for Krishna

Consciousness, Inc.,136 the Court considered the constitutionality of
a restriction designating a location within state fairgrounds where a
religious organization could distribute religious literature and solicit
donations.3 7 The Heffron Court applied intermediate scrutiny
because the dissemination of religious views was protected First
Amendment activity that was being curtailed by the government.
The Court found that the State had a significant interest in
restricting the plaintiffs' speech within the forum.139 The Court also
stated that because plaintiffs maintained the ability to exercise their
protected speech outside the fairgrounds or within the designated
booths, there were alternate channels for expression adequate.'4
By contrast, in City of Ladue v. Gilleo,14' the Supreme Court
invalidated a city ordinance that did not afford the plaintiffs
adequate alternative channels for expression. 14 City of Ladue
involved an ordinance prohibiting homeowners from displaying any
signs on their property except "'residence identification' signs, 'for
sale' signs, and signs warning of safety hazards."'l 43 The Court
noted the unique value of displaying signs at one's home as a form
of expression, and found that the plaintiffs' inability to display signs
135. See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws,
Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted
Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1307 (2005) ("The Court has at times
applied [ample alternative channels] in a demanding manner, for instance
insisting that alternative channels aren't ample if they materially raise the
price of speaking, make it harder for speakers to reach the same listeners, or
subtly influence the content of the message by changing the medium. But at
other times, the Justices have treated this requirement as only a weak
constraint. Such a disparity is to be expected given the vagueness of the term
'ample."').
136. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
137. Id. at 642, 647-51.
138. Id. at 647-48.
139. Id. at 654.
140. Id. at 654-55.
141. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
142. Id. at 58-59.
143. Id. at 45.
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at home left them with no adequate alternate channels through
which they could shape their identities by expressing important
ideas in a cheap and convenient manner.
While the Supreme Court has not explicitly defined
adequate alternative channels for conditional speech restrictions,
the test was applied to a conditional speech restriction by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Velazquez v. Legal Services
Corp. (Velazquez I).145 The Velazquez I court analyzed the holdings

of three Supreme Court cases (discussed below) involving
conditional speech restrictions, and interpreted those holdings to
stand for the proposition that, "in appropriate circumstances,
Congress may burden the First Amendment rights of recipients of
government benefits if the recipients are left with adequate
alternativechannels for protected expression." 4 6
The following cases involved instances where the Court
factored in the presence or absence of alternative channels of
communication in considering whether an unconstitutional
condition existed. A look into the alternative channels analysis in
these cases demonstrates why lower courts have had difficulty
applying the alternative channels test as well as the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.147
A. The "PermissibleNon-Subsidy" Cases
1. Regan v. Taxation with Representation
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation48 ("TWR"),

Taxation with Representation of Washington brought suit after the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied TWR's application for §
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status because "it appeared that a substantial
part of TWR's activities would consist of attempting to influence
legislation."l 49 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
144. Id. at 56-58.
145. 164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999).
146. Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
147. See infra Part III.

148. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
149. Id. at 542.
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mandates that no substantial part of a tax-exempt organization's
activities are "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to
influence legislation."' 50 Therefore, as a condition of receiving tax
exemptions and tax deductibility, § 501(c)(3) organizations must
forego the constitutional right to engage in substantial lobbying.
TWR alleged that the prohibition against substantial lobbying in
order to qualify as a § 501(c)(3) organization was an
unconstitutional condition restricting the organization's right to
free speech. 5 '
The Supreme Court held that no First Amendment
violation occurred, stating: "Congress has not infringed any First
Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity.
Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR's lobbying. We
again reject the 'notion that First Amendment rights are somehow
not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State."l 52 Finding
the speech restriction content-neutral, the Court declined to apply
strict scrutiny, but suggested that strict scrutiny would have applied
had Congress' purpose in restricting lobbying activity been "'aimed
at the suppression of dangerous ideas.'" 53
a. TWR's Alternative Channels Analysis

The Court also noted that TWR retained the ability to
conduct its lobbying activities by creating a separate, tax-exempt §
501(c)(4) affiliate organization for lobbying. 5 4 How central this
finding of an alternative channel was to the outcome of the case is
not entirely clear from the majority opinion, though the Court did
suggest that lobbying through a § 501(c)(4) group would be an
adequate alternative: "The IRS apparently requires only that the
two groups be separately incorporated and keep records adequate

150. Id. at n.1.
151. Id. at 543.
152. Id. at 546 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515
(1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
153. Id. at 549-50 (quoting Cammarano,358 U.S. at 513).
154. Id. at 544.
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to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay for
lobbying. This is not unduly burdensome.""'
Justice Blackmun authored a concurring opinion in TWR, in
which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, 56 wherein he wrote,
"in my view the result under the First Amendment depends entirely
upon the Court's necessary assumption -which I share-about the

manner in which the Internal Revenue Service administers §
501."'" Justice Blackmun stated that, viewed alone, § 501(c)(3)
would be unconstitutional because it denied "a significant benefit to
organizations choosing to exercise their constitutional rights." 58
For Justice Blackmun, what saved the § 501(c)(3)
classification from unconstitutionality was the fact that TWR
maintained an alternative channel through which it could conduct
substantial lobbying in the form of a § 501(c)(4) affiliate
organization.15 While the statutory structure as written provided an
adequate alternative channel for lobbying, Justice Blackmun
cautioned that:
[A]n attempt to prevent § 501(c)(4)
organizations from lobbying explicitly on
behalf of their § 501(c)(3) affiliates would
perpetuate § 501(c)(3) organizations' inability
to make known their views on legislation
without incurring the unconstitutional penalty .
. . . In my view, any such restriction would
render the statutory scheme unconstitutional. 0
The concurring Justices were therefore satisfied that the otherwise
unconstitutional § 501(c)(3) classification could be upheld because
TWR was able to create an affiliate organization that allowed for
an alternative means by which it could continue to receive tax
benefits while still engaging in protected speech (lobbying activity).

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 545 n.6.
Id. at 551 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 552.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 553-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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2. Rust v. Sullivan

Rust v. Sullivan16 1 involved Department of Health and
Human Services regulations that authorized funding for "Title X"
projects promoting family planning with the stipulation that federal
funds could not go to programs where abortion was a method of
family planning. 62 Plaintiffs, entities who received funds to help
establish Title X projects and doctors who supervise Title X funds,
argued that the regulations discriminated on the basis of viewpoint
because they compelled grantees to promote continuing pregnancy
to term while forbidding all discussion about abortion as a lawful
option. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating:
The Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in
the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program which seeks to
deal with the problem in another way. In so
doing, the Government has not discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other.M
a.

Rust's Alternative ChannelsAnalysis

Plaintiffs contended that the funding provision was an
unconstitutional condition because they were forced to choose
between accepting funding and exercising their free speech rights.16 1
To rebut this argument, the Court relied on the concept of the
government speech doctrine.6 This doctrine provides that the First
Amendment does not apply or provide a basis for challenging the

161. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).

162. Id. at 177-78.
163. Id. at 192.
164. Id. at 193.

165. Id. at 196.
166. See id. at 197-200.
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government's actions when the government itself is the speaker.'
The Rust Court distinguished the facts of the case from TWR'6 " "in
which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of
the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus
effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected
conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program."'69
Whereas the conditions at issue in TWR were placed on the
grantees, thereby preventing them from engaging in their desired
speech, the condition in Rust was placed on the program itself.o70
The grantees in Rust could therefore "engage in abortion-related
activity separately from activity receiving federal funding."' 7' The
Rust Court found there to be an adequate alternative channel for
communication, and therefore upheld the condition. 72
The Rust holding suggests that when the government speech
doctrine applies, the adequacy of alternative channels need not be
explored. It appears that so long as the speech restriction is limited
to the scope of the government program, any channels for
expression outside the program will be de facto adequate.

167. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 1015.
168. See infra Part II.B.1.
169. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197 (emphasis in original).
170. For an argument that distinguishing between a condition that
attaches to a program versus a grantee is not as definite as the Rust opinion
suggests, see Chaney, supra note 119, at 285-86.
171. Id. at 198.
172, Id. at 203 ("Under the Secretary's regulations, however, a doctor's
ability to provide, and a woman's right to receive, information concerning
abortion and abortion-related services outside the context of the Title X
project remains unfettered. It would undoubtedly be easier for a woman
seeking an abortion if she could receive information about abortion from a
Title X project, but the Constitution does not require that the Government
distort the scope of its mandated program in order to provide that
information.").
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B. The "Penalty" Cases
1.

FCC v. League of Women Voters of California

73
the
In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,1

Court was again faced with a conditional speech restriction, but this
time applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to find a
violation of an organization's First Amendment rights.174 At issue in
League of Women Voters was the constitutionality of a government
program to fund noncommercial educational broadcasting
stations.'75 The program restricted grantees from engaging in
editorializing of any kind. 7 As was the case in TWR, the restriction
at issue was placed on the grantee rather than the program, because
it prevented the grantee from conducting its protected speech
activity regardless of whether that activity was publicly or privately
financed.7
The League of Women Voters Court determined that

heightened scrutiny was warranted because the speech restriction
was content-based, 7 and also directed at a form of speecheditorial opinions-deserving of the highest degree of First
Amendment protection.179 While the restriction as applied to
another form of media would plainly be subject to strict scrutiny,
the Court noted that unique considerations of the broadcast
173. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
174. Id. at 398-99.
175. Id. at 366.
176. Id. at 375.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 383 ("[Iln order to determine whether a particular statement
by station management constitutes an 'editorial' proscribed by § 399,
enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the message
that is conveyed to determine whether the views expressed concern
'controversial issues of public importance."') (internal quotation marks
omitted). One may wonder why this restriction was found to be content based,
while the restriction in TWR was found to be content neutral-presumably
one would have to "examine the content of the message that is conveyed" to
determine whether the views expressed constituted lobbying.
179. Id. at 381. ("[Ejxpression on public issues has always rested on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.") (citation omitted).
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industry had made it such that the Court has "never gone so far as
to demand that such regulations serve 'compelling' governmental
interests."'80 As such, the Court applied a standard of review more
closely resembling intermediate scrutiny asking whether the
restriction was narrowly tailored to further a substantial
government interest."' The Court doubted the significance of the
government's asserted interests in restricting editorializing without
expressly finding those interests illegitimate, because regardless, the
restriction failed the narrow tailoring requirement. 82
a. League of Women Voter's Alternative Channels Analysis

The Court found that the plaintiffs, owners and operators of
broadcasting stations, were afforded no alternative channel through
which they could conduct their editorial activities."' Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, stated:
In this case, however, unlike the situation faced
by the charitable organization in Taxation With
Representation, a non-commercial educational
station that receives only 1% of its overall
income from CPB grants is barred absolutely
from all editorializing . . . . Of course, if

Congress were to adopt a revised version of §
399 that permitted noncommercial educational
broadcasting stations to establish 'affiliate'
organizations which could then use the station's
facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds,
such a statutory mechanism would plainly be
180. Id. at 376.
181. See id. at 380 ("[T]hese restrictions have been upheld only when we
were satisfied that the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial
governmental interest .... ) (emphasis added).

182. See id. at 398 ("[E]ven if some of the hazards at which § 399 was
aimed are sufficiently substantial, the restriction is not crafted with sufficient
precision to remedy those dangers that may exist to justify the significant
abridgment of speech worked by the provision's broad ban on
editorializing.").
183. Id. at 399-400.
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valid under the reasoning of Taxation With
184
Representation.

Though speaking in dicta, the League of Women Voters Court
clearly felt that the possibility for the group to create an affiliate
organization to engage in editorializing would have saved an
otherwise unconstitutional condition.1'8 The Court viewed the
restriction as a penalty because, without the ability to establish
affiliates, grantees could not engage in their protected speech using
funds from private sources, and so were left without adequate
alternate channels to editorialize.

What is interesting about the Court's adequate alternative
channels analysis is that the Court would have upheld the
restriction had adequate alternative channels existed, even though
the restriction was content-based and the important government
interests and narrow tailoring requirements had not been met. The
opinion invites the troubling possibility that courts will be satisfied
that a conditional speech restriction can be upheld so long as
adequate alternative channels for expression are afforded. More
troubling still is the fact that the Court summarily found that the
creation of an affiliate organization to engage in editorializing
would be an adequate alternative, which suggests that a reviewing
court could not only ignore the requirements that a restriction be
content-neutral, serve important government interests, and be
narrowly tailored, but a court could also view alternative channels
under a lower scrutiny stnadard.m
By relying on TWR's determination that affiliate
organizations afford an adequate alternative without conducting an
184. Id. at 400.
185. Id. ("Under such a statute, public broadcasting stations would be
free, in the same way that the charitable organization in Taxation With
Representation was free, to make known its views on matters of public
importance through its nonfederally funded, editorializing affiliate without
losing federal grants for its noneditorializing broadcast activities.").
186. Id. at 400-01.
187. Cf Lee, supra note 133, at 809 ("[In cases in which the Court has
presumed the availability of alternatives, the minimal scrutiny applied to the
substantiality of the government's interests and the narrowness of the
government's methods has guaranteed that the regulation will be sustained.").
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inquiry into the adequacy of such an affiliate for the purpose of
editorializing, the League of Women Voters opinion comes close to
announcing a per se rule that affiliate organizations will serve as
adequate alternatives for conditional speech restrictions. This "one
size fits all" in adequate alternative channels analysis would in no
way guarantee the protection of an organization's speech rights in
each particular circumstance."
2.

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez (Velazquez II)

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez'8 ' involved a restriction in
the Legal Services Corporation Act that prohibited grantees from
representing clients challenging existing welfare law.'" The Act was
designed to provide financial support for legal assistance to indigent
clients in noncriminal matters.'9 '
The Supreme Court invalidated the restriction.192 The Court
interpreted Rust's government speech doctrine as permitting
viewpoint-based restrictions where the government is the speaker
or enlists private speakers to "transmit specific information
pertaining to its own program." 93 Because grantees under the LSC
program were meant to speak on behalf of their clients and not on
behalf of the government, the Court found the government speech
doctrine inapplicable and thus the regulation to be impermissibly
viewpoint-based.'94 Refuting the government's argument that the
restriction was necessary to define the scope of the program, the
Court stated that "Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as

188. Cf id. at 810 ("Absent careful analysis of the adequacy of
alternative means of communication, the Court abrogates its responsibility to
ensure that expression remains free.").

189. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
190. Id. at 539.
191. Id. at 536.
192. Id. at 549.
193. Id. at 541.
194. Id. at 542. ("The lawyer is not the government's speaker. The
attorney defending the decision to deny benefits will deliver the government's
message in the litigation. The LSC lawyer, however, speaks on the behalf of
his or her private, indigent client.").
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a mere definition of its program in every case, lest the First
Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise."
a. Velazquez II's Alternative ChannelsAnalysis

The government also argued that attorneys seeking to
represent clients in challenges to existing welfare law could simply
withdraw from the program.
Having declined to apply the
government speech doctrine, the Court engaged in a more
searching review of the adequacy of alternative channels for
expression. The Court did not focus on the speech of the direct
recipient of government funds, the legal organizations, but instead
looked to the indirect beneficiaries of the government funds, the
indigent clients, and the effect of the condition on their right to
receive information.'97 If an attorney would be forced to withdraw
from the program because the client sought to challenge existing
welfare law, "[t]here often will be no alternative source for the
client to receive vital information respecting constitutional and
statutory rights bearing upon claimed benefits."' 98
The Court compared the effect of the condition on the
indirect beneficiaries of the government funds to the situation in
Rust.'99 The Court stated:
[In Rust], a patient could receive the approved
Title X family planning counseling funded by
the Government and later could consult an
affiliate or independent organization to receive
abortion counseling. Unlike indigent clients
who seek LSC representation, the patient in
Rust was not required to forfeit the
Government-funded advice when she also

195. Id. at 547.
196. Id. at 546.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 547.
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received
abortion
counseling
through
2
0
alternative channels.
Because the client would likely be unable to find another attorney
to advise him and argue his case for the welfare statute's invalidity,
there was "no alternative channel for expression of the advocacy
Congress seeks to restrict." 2 0 1

III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT-SECOND CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The DKT II Court Upholds the Policy Requirement

DKT International (DKT), based in Washington D.C., is a
nonprofit organization designed "to promote family planning and
HIV/AIDS prevention through social marketing," and today is "the
largest private provider of contraceptives and family planning
services in the developing world." 202 In 2005, DKT received sixteen
percent of its total budget from USAID, one agency responsible for
awarding Leadership Act grants to organizations.20 DKT refused to
adopt the policy opposing prostitution because it believed that
doing so might result in "stigmatizing and alienating many of the
people most vulnerable to HIV/AIDS -the sex workers." 204
When it did not receive funding under the Act, DKT
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.205 DKT argued that the Policy Requirement, which
conditioned federal grants on the grantees' explicit statement
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking, was an unconstitutional
condition on their free speech rights. 206 DKT advanced three points
in support of this argument: the Policy Requirement constituted a
200. Id.
201. Id. at 546-47 (emphasis added).
202. ABOUT
DKT,
DKT
INTERNATIONAL
(2013),
http://www.dktinternational.org/about-dkt (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
203. DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT II), 477 F.3d 758,
760 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
204. Id. at 761 (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT 1), 435 F. Supp.
2d 5 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
206. Id. at 7.
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viewpoint-based restriction on speech; its viewpoint-based nature
called for strict scrutiny; and the Requirement failed strict scrutiny
because it was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
government interest. 207
USAID argued that strict scrutiny was not proper because
DKT's speech was not directly restricted - they could always
decline funding and advocate their position with private funds.2 8
USAID maintained that Congress was not obligated to subsidize
DKT's policy stances. 209 They argued that the Policy Requirement
should not be evaluated under the framework of the First
Amendment, but rather through the Spending Clause, which
"implicitly authorized [the government] to legislate funding
eligibility restrictions." 210
The district court found the Policy Requirement to be a
viewpoint and content-based restriction, therefore calling for strict
scrutiny. 21' The court stated that "[t]he government's interest in
preventing garbling of its message, maintaining integrity of federal
programs, and speaking in a single voice cannot result in compelling
organizations, like DKT, to parrot the government's policies." 212
Section 7631(e), which prevented funding from going to any
organization who advocated for the legalization of prostitution or
sex trafficking, was found to be narrowly tailored; but § 7631(f)
went too far by refusing funds to any group without a statement
denouncing prostitution.213 The court stated that, "[b]ecause 7631(f)
casts too wide a net and is not narrowly tailored, DKT's exercise of
its private speech funded by private means is infringed. In other
words, because § 7631(f) is not narrowly tailored, it broadly and
impermissibly binds both the private and public funds of DKT." 2 14

207. Id. at 10-11.

208. Id. at 11.
209. Id.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
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The district court therefore struck down the requirement as a
violation of DKT's First Amendment speech rights.21
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
found the Policy Requirement to "discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint.

,216

However, the DKT II court reversed the district

217

court, relying primarily on Rust's application of the government
speech doctrine -that the government can employ private speakers
to espouse its own message.218 The DKT II court acknowledged that
like the restriction in Rust, the Policy Requirement was a restriction
on a project rather than a grantee.219 However, the court was
persuaded that the dispositive element for the Supreme Court
upholding the restriction in Rust was the fact that the grantees were
not prohibited from "engaging in the protected conduct outside the
scope of the federally funded program." 220 Thus, the DKT II court
found the facts of the present case to be more analogous to those in
TWR, where a restriction placed on the grant recipient was upheld
because the grantees could create an affiliate organization in order
to engage in the proscribed speech. 221 Therefore, an adequate
alternative channel existed because "[n]othing prevents DKT from
itself remaining neutral and setting up a subsidiary organization
that certifies it has a policy opposing prostitution." 222 The D.C.
Circuit therefore held that the Policy Requirement did not violate
the First Amendment because there were alternative means by
which DKT could engage in its speech.223

215. Id. at 18.
216. DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT II), 477 F.3d 758,
761 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
217. Id. at 759.
218. Id. at 761.
219. Id. at 763.
220. Id. (citation omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id.

223. Id. at 764.

2013]

ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS TEST

675

B. The AOSI Court Strikes Down the Policy Requirement
In Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. v. U.S.
Agency for InternationalDevelopment (A OSI 1),224 the U.S. District

Court for the Southern District of New York heard the same
challenge to the Policy Requirement involved in the DKT case.
The parties who brought suit in AOSI I included the Open Society
Institute (OSI, though now known as the Open Society
Foundations), Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.
(AOSI), and the Pathfinder Institute.226 OSI is a New York-based
nonprofit foundation that supports a network of foundations
operating worldwide.227 AOSI, a member of OSI, is a nonprofit
organization whose mission is to "promote democratic governance,
human rights, public health and economic, legal and social reform
in Central Asia."228 Pathfinder is a nonprofit organization that
"provides family planning and reproductive health services in

twenty countries."229
In addition to USAID, the plaintiffs in AOSI I named the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as
defendants.230 HHS also distributes funds under the Leadership
Act, and the CDC coordinates HHS's Global AIDS Program,
which "assists with surveillance, training, monitoring, evaluation,
and implementation of HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care
programs, by partnering with governments, non-governmental
organizations ('NGOs'), international organizations, U.S.-based
universities and the private sector."21 Both AOSI and Pathfinder
had received funding from USAID pursuant to the Leadership Act

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

430 F. Supp. 2d 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 231.
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(and Pathfinder also received funding through HHS and CDC), and
232
both groups also received funding from private sources.
The AOSI I court emphasized the value of the restricted
speech in the case, noting the plaintiffs' involvement in "eminently
debatable questions such as what may be the most appropriate or
effective policy to engage high-risk groups in such efforts," and that
"[tihe Policy Requirement, to the extent it prevents NGOs from
speaking openly on such questions with their private funds,
contravenes our national commitment [to] open debate and our

First Amendment values." 233
The court found the opinions of TWR, League of Women
Voters, and Rust to provide the framework for resolving the issue.2?3
Under this framework the court found heightened scrutiny to be
appropriate, while acknowledging that those Supreme Court cases
gave "no settled articulation of the heightened standard of review
in this area of the law." 2 35 The court rejected the government's
argument for rational basis review in part because plaintiffs were
not afforded adequate alternative channels of communication.23 6
Instead, the court looked to whether the restriction was narrowly
tailored to achieve the government's stated purpose, a test more
closely resembling intermediate scrutiny.237 The court chose this
test, which is more deferential than the strict scrutiny applied in
DKT 1, because the "narrow tailoring test has been applied in
analogous situations in which a regulation or statute touches on
competing constitutional interests, or where there is some
232. Id. at 229-30. OSI did not receive funding under the Leadership
Act, but feared that it could jeopardize AOSI's Leadership Act funds by not
also explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking. Id. at 229. The AOSI I
court did not find for OSI because they were not subject to the Policy
Requirement, either as a grantee or as a sub-grantee. Id. at 277.
233. Id. at 263.
234. Id. at 260 ("Taken together, these decisions suggest that when
Congress burdens the First Amendment rights of recipients of government
benefits by placing restrictions on the eligibility for or use of such benefits, it
must leave the recipients with adequate freedom to engage in protected
expression through unregulated means.").
235. Id. at 267.
236. Id. at 261-62.
237. Id. at 267.

20131

ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS TEST

677

government justification for speech-related harm-for example, in
both the commercial speech context and also in the analysis of time,
place, and manner restrictions."2 38
The district court found that the government had failed to
show a significant interest in the restriction because certain
organizations were exempted from the Policy Requirement.239 The
court also found the Policy Requirement was not narrowly tailored
because plaintiffs were forced to state their opposition to
prostitution and sex trafficking outside the scope of the government
program.240 Responding to the government's contention that
plaintiffs always maintained the ability to speak freely by not
participating in the government program, the court stated:
The outcome for which the Government
advocates would result in a potentially
troublesome government funding arena, one in
which the government would have the
unmitigated ability to wield its spending power
to play favorites, as described above, by
supporting and thereby strengthening only
those NGOs, entities, and individuals that
convey
messages
supportive
of
the
government's viewpoint, while placing at a
disadvantage, and potentially weakening, those
that decline to endorse the government's
message. Insofar as the government engages in
this form of viewpoint favoritism among
significant players in the public debate of vital
issues, whether by coercion or by inducements
available only to those who would agree with
238. Id. at 268.
239. Id. at 269 ("The Government's purported fear of its message being
garbled by organizations that accept the Agencies' funds while simultaneously
using their own funds to [endorse], either implicitly or explicitly, the very
practices that the program aims to eliminate ... is not sufficient to warrant the
blanket ban on Plaintiffs' privately funded speech when the exempted
organizations are free under the Act to make just such endorsements should
they see fit.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id. at 270.
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the government's line, the practice would tend
to offset the delicate balance of the power
relationship between the government and the
public that the First Amendment works to
calibrate.241
The AOSI I court, recognizing the implications of government
using its spending power to shift public debate on vital issues, found
the Policy Requirement to be an unconstitutional prohibition of the
plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free speech. 242
After the AOSI I decision was handed down, HHS and
USAID developed new Guidelines in 2007 designed to alleviate
some of the burden placed on organizations who sought funding
under the Act by allowing for affiliate structures. 243 The Guidelines
permitted grant recipients to partner with affiliate organizations
that did not comply with the Policy Requirement, provided that the
two organizations maintained "adequate separation."2 4 This
separation would be found if (1) legal separation existed between
the organizations; (2) no Leadership Act funds were used to aid the
affiliate; and (3) the organizations were "physically and financially
separate."245 In light of these new Guidelines, the Second Circuit
remanded the case for the district court to determine whether an
246
injunction continued to be a necessary remedy.
On remand, AOSI and Pathfinder sought to add Global
Health Council (GHC), an alliance of organizations dedicated to
international public health, and InterAction, "the largest alliance of
United States-based international development and humanitarian
non-governmental organizations ('NGOs')," to the complaint, and
241. Id. at 276.
242. Id. at 278.
243. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev.
(AOSI IV), 651 F.3d 218, 225-26 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, _ U.S. -, 133
S. Ct. 928 (2013).
244. Id. at 226.
245. Id. Additional guidance promulgated by HHS and USAID in 2010
revised the Guidelines to no longer require legal separation (though it would
still be a factor), and to no longer consider separate management as a relevant
factor in determining physical and financial separation. Id. at 227.
246. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev.
(A OSI II), No. 06-4035-CV, 2007 WL 3334335, at *846 (2d. Cir. Nov. 8, 2007).
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to extend the preliminary injunction to them.247 The trial court
granted the motion to add these plaintiffs, and despite the new
Guidelines, affirmed its previous holding that the Policy
Requirement was an unconstitutional condition of plaintiff
organizations' speech.24
The court affirmed the application of heightened scrutiny, 249
and posited two primary reasons for finding the Guidelines
inadequate as curative measures for the constitutional defects of
the Policy Requirement.250 First, "[wihile the Guidelines may or
may not provide an adequate alternate channel for Plaintiffs to
express their views regarding prostitution, the clause requiring
Plaintiffs to adopt the Government's view regarding the legalization
of prostitution remains intact." 2 5' Also, "the Guidelines require
more separation than is reasonably necessary to satisfy the
Government's legitimate interest, embodied in the Policy
Requirement, and that the Guidelines are not narrowly tailored to

achieve Congress's goals." 25 2
On appeal for the second time, defendants argued that,
because Congress has broad powers under the Spending Clause,
and because the organizations were free to decline funding should
they wish not to comply with the conditions, the Policy
Requirement of the Leadership Act should only be subjected to
minimal scrutiny.25 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in AOSI
IV, rejected this argument.254 The court outlined the

247. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev.
(AOSI III), 570 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
248. Id. at 550. It is interesting to note that DKT is a member
organization of GHC, and as such, was barred from relief in the case because
of the principle of res judicata.See id.
249. Id. at 547.
250. See id. at 545-49.
251. Id. at 545.
252. Id. at 549.
253. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev.
(A OSI IV), 651 F.3d 218, 231 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, - U.S.

Ct. 928 (2013).
254. Id. at 234.
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unconstitutional conditions doctrine25 and then looked to Supreme
Court cases involving conditional speech restrictions, analyzing the
holdings of TWR, League of Women Voters, Rust, and Velazquez
II.256 To

the court, a synthesis of these cases showed that heightened
scrutiny applied when the government restriction was contentbased,257 but that, "in appropriate circumstances, Congress may
burden the First Amendment rights of recipients of government
benefits if the recipients are left with adequate alternative channels
for protected expression." 258 Also, the restriction could be upheld if,
as in Rust, the government itself was the speaker or enlisted private
speakers to promote the government's message. 259 Using the
framework developed from those cases, the court identified two
facets of the Policy Requirement that warranted heightened
scrutiny: the viewpoint-based nature of the speech restriction, and
the fact that plaintiffs were affirmatively required to speak that
260
viewpoint.
The opinion suggests that the majority found affirmative
restrictions (compelled speech) to be inherently more suspect than
negative restrictions (compelled silence), stating that "[u]nlike the
funding conditions in the cases discussed above, the Policy
Requirement does not merely restrict recipients from engaging in
certain expression . . . but pushes considerably further and

mandates that recipients affirmatively say something." 261 The court
went on to say that "[c]ompelling speech as a condition of receiving
a government benefit cannot be squared with the First

255. Id. at 231 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972))

("[T]he government may not place a condition on the receipt of a benefit or
subsidy that infringes upon the recipient's constitutionally protected rights,
even if the government has no obligation to offer the benefit in the first
instance.").
256. Id. at 231-33.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 233 (quoting Velazquez v. Legal Services Corp. (Velazquez I),
164 F.3d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1999).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 235-36. The court never explains whether it applied
intermediate or strict scrutiny. See id. at 234-36.
261. Id. at 234 (emphasis in original).
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Amendment," 262 citing the Supreme Court cases of Wooley v.
Maynard,263 Speiser v. Randall,264 and West Virginia State Board of

Education v. Barnette.265 These cases involved instances where
individuals were compelled to express the government's view.
While Speiser involved a conditional speech restriction, Wooley and
Barnette involved speech compelled through threat of government
reprimand.2 66
The court also found the Policy Requirement to be
viewpoint based "because it requires recipients to take the
government's side on a particular issue." 267 Furthermore, the court
determined heightened scrutiny to be particularly necessary where
the restricted viewpoints constituted views on matters of public
importance, stating that "[t]he right to communicate freely on such
matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First
Amendment." 268 The court stressed that the restriction commanded
heightened scrutiny not because the grantees' position was correct,
but because the speech concerned a controversial public issue, a
type of speech receiving the highest degree of First Amendment
protection.269

262. Id.
263. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
264. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
265. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
266. Compare Speiser, 357 U.S. at 516 (involving California law
conditioning a property-tax exemption for veterans on the veteran signing a
statement on his tax return stating that he would not advocate for the
overthrow of the U.S. or California governments), with Wooley, 430 U.S. at
707 (regarding a New Hampshire statute making it a misdemeanor to obstruct
from view the motto "Live Free or Die" on vehicle license plates), and
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626-29 (involving the West Virginia State Board of
Education requiring students to salute the American flag or face expulsion).
267. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. United States Agency for Int'l
Dev. (A OSI IV), 651 F.3d. 218, 235 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted,_ U.S. _, 133
S. Ct. 928 (2013).
268. Id. at 236 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
913 (1982) ("[E]xpression on public issues has always rested on the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.")).
269. Id. at n.4. Cf Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) ("It is precisely this kind of choice, between

682

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11I

The government argued that the Policy Requirement was
necessary to transmit information related to a government
program, and that the condition should therefore be upheld under
Rust's government speech doctrine. 27 0 The court found the
government speech doctrine inapplicable because, unlike in Rust,
the condition in this case required grantees to voice the
government's viewpoint as if it were their own.271 While noting that
this type of condition may be permissible in instances where the
government's program is in effect its message, the court found that
exception inapplicable here because the purpose of the program
was to combat HIV/AIDS, not to campaign against prostitution.27 2
The court rejected the government's argument that advocating
against prostitution was central to the program because § 7631(f)
expressly exempted certain other AIDS and international
organizations from the Policy Requirement. 273
The court concluded by rejecting the government's
argument that the agency Guidelines addressed any compelled
speech problems in the Policy Requirement. 274 The court looked to
the adequate alternative channels test from Velazquez I and found
that the Guidelines did not satisfy the test, stating that:

the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is
freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.").
270. A OSI IV, 651 F.3d. at 236-37.
271. Id. at 237 ("Suffice it to say that Rust would have been a very
different case had the government gone as far as requiring Title X recipients
to affirmatively adopt a policy statement opposing abortion, in the way the
Leadership Act mandates the adoption of a policy statement opposing
prostitution.").
272. Id. at 237-38 ("[If the government were to fund a campaign urging
children to 'Just Say No' to drugs, we do not doubt that it could require
grantees to state that they oppose drug use by children. But in that scenario,
the government's program is, in effect, its message.

. .

. Defendants cannot

now recast the Leadership Act's global HIV/AIDS-prevention program as an
anti-prostitution messaging campaign." (emphasis in original)).
273. Id. at 238. See 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006) ("[T]his subsection shall
not apply to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the
World Health Organization, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative or to
any United Nations agency.").
274. ASOI IV, 651 F.3d. at 239.
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The curative function of an "adequate
alternative channel" is to alleviate the burden
of a constraint on speech by providing an outlet
that allows an organization to engage -through
the use of an affiliate-in the privately funded
expression that otherwise would have been
impermissibly prohibited by the federal
program ..

.

. It simply does not make sense to

conceive of the Guidelines here as somehow
addressing
the
Policy
Requirement's
affirmative speech requirement by affording an
outlet to engage in privately funded silence; in
other words, by providing an outlet to do
nothing at all.275
Thus, the use of an affiliate organization was inadequate as an
alternative channel of communication because even if an affliate
group was created to oppose prostitution, the requirement for
denouncing it remained intact. Also, the AOSI IV court struck
down the Policy Requirement,2 16 splitting with the D.C. Circuit on
the issue of what constitutes adequate alternative channels. The
Supreme Court will not draw a bright-line rule for what constitutes
an adequate alternative channel on appeal, but the Court will
nonetheless be forced to resolve the issue of whether creating an
affiliate organization in order to remain silent suffices as an
adequate alternative.
C. The AOSI IV Court'sAffirmative/Negative Speech
DistinctionJeopardizesIts Holding on Appeal
As noted above, the AOSI IV court found that because the
Policy Requirement forces groups to affirmatively endorse the
government's viewpoint, it warranted heightened scrutiny.277 The

275. Id. (emphasis in original).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 234.
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AOSI IV court's suggestion that compelling speech is more suspect
than compelling silence is without strong precedential support.278
There is, however, some support in two Supreme Court
cases to which the AOSI IV court cited. In Barnette, which involved
compelling students to salute the flag in school, the Court stated
that "[i]t would seem that involuntary affirmation could be
commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than
silence."279 Thus, Barnette suggests that the government's
justifications must be stronger when it compels speech than when it
mandates silence.m
The AOSI IV court also cited to Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and InstitutionalRights, Inc. ("FAIR"), 28' a case involving

the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, which withheld
federal grants from law schools that denied military recruiters
access equal to that of other employment recruiters because of the
military's stance on homosexuality. 2 Consistent with this
requirement, schools seeking federal grants would be compelled to
speak, and thus suggest support for the military's viewpoint, by way
of sending emails and posting notices informing students of the
military recruiters, assuming they did the same for other
recruiters.2 83 The Court distinguished the compelled speech cases of
Barnette and Wooley, noting that "[t]here is nothing in this case
approaching a Government-mandated pledge or motto that the
school must endorse."284 However, this quote from FAIR does not
seem to support the AOSI IV court's affirmative/negative speech
distinction when read in context of the opinion.285 As Circuit Judge
Chester Straub points out in his dissent in AOSI IV, the FAIR
278. See id. at 256-58 (Straub, J., dissenting).
279. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).
280. See AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 242 (Straub, J., dissenting) ("[T]he

Supreme Court has suggested, without holding, that the government may be
required to assert an even more compelling interest when it infringes the right
to refrain from speaking than is required when it infringes the right to
speak.").
281. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
282. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 51.
283. Id. at 61-62.
284. Id. at 62.
285. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 258 (quoting FAIR, 547 U.S. at 61-62).
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Court was not drawing a distinction based on affirmative or
negative speech restrictions, but rather on the content of the speech
involved in the cases." While the compelled speech in Barnette
(salute to the flag) and Wooley (displaying state motto on license
plates) both depended on the content of the message, the
compelled speech at issue before the FAIR Court did "not dictate
the content of the speech at all."2 87
While Barnette (and FAIR to a much lesser extent) may
lend some support to the AOSI IV court's conclusion, the Supreme
Court has been more consistent in finding the right to speak and the
right to silence to be on equal footing.m The Wooley Court stated
that "[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual
freedom of mind."'m9 The Supreme Court has also explicitly said
that "[tihere is certainly some difference between compelled speech
and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the
difference is without constitutional significance, for the First
Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily
comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say."290
The AOSI IV court attempted to recast Wooley and
Barnette as unconstitutional condition cases in order to support the
proposition that affirmative speech restrictions "push considerably
further" than the negative conditional speech restrictions
286. Id. at 257-58 (Straub, J., dissenting).

287. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 62. ("Compelling a law school that sends
scheduling e-mails for other recruiters to send one for a military recruiter is
simply not the same as forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or forcing a
Jehovah's Witness to display the motto 'Live Free or Die,' and it trivializes the
freedom protected in Barnette and Wooley to suggest that it is.").
288. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256
(1974) ("The Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a
statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish specified matter.
Governmental restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional
patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on governmental powers.")
(citation omitted).
289. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
290. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988)
(emphasis in original).
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previously at issue before the Supreme Court.291 The majority
acknowledged that Wooley and Barnette did not involve
unconstitutional conditions, yet framed the facts of those cases as if
they did. 292 The court's reliance on the distinction between
compelled speech and compelled silence is not only without
support,29 3 but it was also unnecessary to apply heightened scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has long held that viewpoint based speech
regulations are subject to heightened scrutiny, which the AOSI IV
court applied to the Policy Requirement. Far from lending support
to the holding, the affirmative/negative distinction the AOSI IV
court draws places an otherwise well-reasoned opinion on unstable
ground. If the Supreme Court decides to reverse the Second
Circuit, this unfounded basis for applying heightened scrutiny will
undoubtedly provide fuel for the fire.
IV. THE NEED TO CLARIFY ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE
CHANNELS INTHE SUPREME COURT'S AOSI DECISION
A. The Supreme Court Should Follow the AOSI IV Court's
Method for When to Apply the Adequate Alternative
Channels Test
While the Court will be able to invalidate the Policy
Requirement in the AOSI case without upsetting established

291. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 214.
292. The majority describes Wooley as "finding unconstitutional
requirement that drivers, as condition of using the roads, display state motto
'Live Free or Die' on license plates...." Id. (emphasis added). In a similar
fashion, Barnette is described as "finding unconstitutional requirement that
schoolchildren, as condition of going to school, salute the flag." Id. (emphasis
added).
293. See Alexander P. Wentworth-Ping, Note, Funding Conditions and
Free Speech for HIV/AIDS NGOs: He Who Pays the Piper Cannot Always
Call the Tune, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1097, 1141-42 (2012) (arguing that the
concept of compelled speech is not relevant to the unconstitutional conditions
analysis). But see Ullian,supra note 68, at 731 ("The Supreme Court in [FAIR]
clearly indicated that a funding condition that forced a recipient to endorse
government-mandated speech would be an unconstitutional condition.").
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precedent,294 the Court should seize the opportunity to clarify the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine so as to avoid further
confusion. As seen above, the Supreme Court's conditional speech
restriction cases have been far from consistent in determining when
a restriction amounts to an unconstitutional condition. Whether the
condition is termed a "penalty" or a "non-subsidy" has proven a
determinative factor in whether the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine applies, and yet there is no guidance from the Court to
indicate what about a condition will cause it to fall under one of
these categories, nor is there an indication of whether the line
between the two can be clearly defined. This lack of clarity is
problematic for the government when it seeks to restrict speech and
for the lower courts when they are asked to determine the
constitutionality of such restrictions.
This Note argues that this problem can be alleviated by
expressly defining an adequate alternative channels test for
conditional speech cases. As seen in the cases discussed above, the
Supreme Court has not yet expressly stated that it will apply an
adequate alternative channels test for conditional speech cases, and
also has not stated at what point in its analysis it will look to
alternative channels.
If the adequate alternative channels test is not explicitly
defined in the conditional speech context, it invites the possibility
for judges to apply the test as a way to justify using less exacting
scrutiny in balancing competing interests. 295 This situation may have
already played out to some extent in TWR. As discussed above,2 96
Justice Blackmun and two others concurred in that case to express

294. See Ullian, supra note 68, at 740 ("Invalidating the Policy
Requirement ..

.

. is based largely on longstanding precedent and does not

require the overturning or modification of any current case law.").
295. See Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1995). Professor Post describes the Court's application of
the adequate alternative channels test as "extraordinarily lenient," and that,
"[s]een from a sufficiently detached perspective, of course, 'alternative'
channels of communication will always exist." Id. at 1263. Post expresses
concern for what he sees as the Court's use of the adequate alternative
channels test as a means of disguising a balancing inquiry. Id. at 1264.
296. See supra Part II.A.1.
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that TWR's ability to establish an affiliate organization was the key
reason for upholding the statute. 29 7 Blackmun may have concurred
because the majority would have upheld the statute regardless of
whether TWR had an adequate alternative channel available. If this
is the case, then it would seem unnecessary for the majority to have
engaged in this analysis at all. That the Court did so might suggest
that it was speaking in dicta, or perhaps that it was providing a basis
for the statute to be reviewed in a more deferential light. 2 98
If the Supreme Court continues using an adequate
alternative channels test for conditional speech restrictions, it
should explicitly state the test so as to provide guidance for when
and how the test will apply. As for when the test should apply, the
Court should look to the AOSI IV court's opinion. The AOSI IV
court applied the adequate alternative channels test only after
determining that heightened scrutiny applied to the Policy
Requirement. The court expressly recognized adequate alternative
channels as being a "curative function" for an otherwise
impermissible speech restriction. 299 By recognizing the
constitutional deficiency of the speech restriction before looking to
alternative channels, a court gives more teeth to the test through
more searching inquiry into whether the alternative is truly
"adequate," rather than an inquiry simply into whether alternatives
exist.3m Viewed under heightened scrutiny, the presence of
297. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 552 (1983)

(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The constitutional defect that would inhere in §
501(c)(3) alone is avoided by § 501(c)(4).").
298. See Chaney, supra note 119, at 279-80 (arguing that a different
standard of review applies in "permissible non-subsidy" cases, where the
Supreme Court will apply an "undue burden" test instead of the adequate
alternative channels test).
299. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l v. U.S. Agency of Int'l Dev. (AOSI
IV), 651 F.3d 218, 239 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted,

_

U.S. _,

133 S. Ct. 928

(2013).
300. See Lee, supra note 133, at 806 ("[T]he adequacy of alternatives
cannot be assumed; a detailed analysis of factors such as autonomy from
gatekeepers, cost, and the ability to reach the intended audience is
necessary."). The DKT II court, for example, never expressly recognized any
constitutional deficiency in the Policy Requirement. The court looked to
whether an alternative channel existed, and seemed satisfied when the
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adequate alternative channels allows the government to overcome
301
the presumption that the restriction is unconstitutional.
B. The AOSI IV Majority Correctly Applied the Adequate
Alternative Channels Test
As discussed above, the Supreme Court should follow the
A OSI IV court in explaining when to apply the adequate alternative
channels test. In light of the theory behind the adequate alternative
channels test it is clear that, of the circuit court opinions applying
the test, the A OSI IV majority was also the one to correctly
determine how it is to be applied.
The DKT II court found an adequate alternative channel
because, while the Policy Requirement alone required DKT to
disavow prostitution both inside and outside the scope of the
program, DKT could remain neutral and create an affiliate that
government could show that an alternative did exist without probing into its
adequacy, as evidenced by an exchange at oral argument:
COURT: Suppose that DKT just spins off a subsidiary
corporation, and the subsidiary takes the pledge, but the
parent organization does not. Is that okay? There's
nothing in the regulations that would prohibit that, is
there?
GOVERNMENT COUNSEL: There's absolutely nothing
in the regulations that could prohibit it. . . . There's

nothing preventing them from doing that.
COURT: All their complaints could be solved by a
corporate reorganization?
GOVERNMENT COUNSEL: That's right.
DKT Int'l v. U.S. Agency of Int'l Dev. (DKT II), 477 F.3d 758, 764 n.4 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
301. See Ullian, supra note 68, at 729 ("In circumstances involving
government speech or adequate alternative channels, the presumption of
unconstitutionality for laws abridging freedom of speech can be overcome.").
Some restrictions will not overcome the presumption regardless of whether
adequate alternative channels exist, such as when strict scrutiny is applied to a
content-based restriction. See Volokh, supra note 135, at 1307 ("[T]he Court
has been right . . . to treat content-based restrictions as presumptively

unconstitutional without an inquiry into how much the restriction burdens
speech or into whether the restriction leaves open ample alternative
channels.").
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would receive Leadership Act funds and pledge an opposition to
prostitution. 302 The court did not provide more in-depth analysis,
and for that reason it may be helpful to look to AOSI IV's
dissenting opinion to illuminate the argument that alternative
channels were adequate in the DKT II.
In a lengthy and strongly-worded dissent, Judge Straub
argued that a condition is not unconstitutional where the
government seeks to control the message of its own program303 and
the conditions do not limit free speech outside the scope of the
government program.30 Judge Straub stated that "[w]hen adequate
alternative channels are available, any restrictions on protected
First Amendment activity imposed within the scope of the federal
program only apply to that federally funded program and therefore
are not the equivalent of direct restrictions" like the criminal
charges at issue in Wooley.30 s The Agency Guidelines clearly
demonstrated that adequate alternative channels existed because
plaintiffs were allowed to "create affiliate organizations to receive
Leadership Act funds" and still "continue to remain silent or to
espouse a pro-prostitution message with non-Leadership Act
funds." 306 Judge Straub accordingly sided with the DKT II court in
finding that the Policy Requirement does not restrict First
Amendment speech outside the scope of the Leadership Act
307
program.
Responding to the majority's argument that the affiliate
structure cannot remedy a compelled speech condition "by
affording an outlet to engage in privately funded silence,"308 Judge
Straub stated that:

302. DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT II), 477 F.3d 758,
763 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
303. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l v. U.S. Agency of Int'l Dev. (AOSI
IV), 651 F.3d 218, 240 (2d Cir. 2011) (Straub, J., dissenting), cert. granted,
U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013).
304. Id. at 248 (Straub, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 249 (Straub, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 259 (Straub, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 258.
308. Id. at 259 (emphasis in original).
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The cases we summarized . . . all dealt with

subsidy conditions that imposed negative
restrictions on speech and therefore it is no
surprise that the dual-structures contemplated
were thought of as "adequate alternative
channels" for restricted speech rather than for
the right to refrain from speaking. In this case,
it may be that it does not make sense to think
of the Guidelines as providing an "outlet to
engage in privately funded silence" . . . but that

does not affect whether affiliate provisions, like
the Guidelines, prevent subsidy conditions, like
the Policy Requirement, from amounting to
penalties on First Amendment rights. I see no
reason why an affirmative-speech subsidy
condition should be treated differently.
Judge Straub is correct that the Court had not previously dealt with
the adequacy of alternative channels for plaintiffs who were
compelled to speak as a condition of receiving a government
benefit. However, his analysis falls short to the extent that it
suggests that an affiliate structure would cure the constitutional
defects of the condition ipso facto. 1 o
The curative function of the adequate alternative channel is
that it offers a way for the grantee to receive the government
benefit without wholly surrendering his constitutional right to free
speech. Announcing a per se rule that affiliate organizations serve
as adequate alternatives reduces the adequate alternative channels
test to an "alternative channels test," relieving the government of

309. Id. at 259 n.5.
310. The idea of affiliate organizations serving as an "adequate"
alternative has been challenged. One commentator noted: "In practice, this
wasteful and duplicative alternative is impossible. Of the approximately 200
legal services programs nationwide, only a handful have even attempted to set
up such facilities, and those few that have done so have struggled." Madeline
Lee, Why I'm Suing the FederalGovernment, FOUND. NEWS & COMMENT. 24
(May/June 2002), availableat http://www.foundationnews.org/CME/article.
cfm?ID=1953.
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its burden in each case to show that the plaintiff's particular
message can be adequately conveyed in an alternative manner.31
The deficiency of the affiliate structure as a curative
measure in AOSI IV can be seen in comparison with the affiliate
structure in TWR. TWR, acting alone, could not conduct the speech
activity it preferred (substantial lobbying) and receive government
benefits (tax exemption). However, treating TWR and its affiliate
as one entity, TWR could both conduct its preferred speech activity
and receive government benefits. By contrast, AOSI IV plaintiffs,
acting alone, could not conduct the speech activity they preferred
(silence) and receive government benefits (Leadership Act funds).
Together with an affiliate structure, AOSI IV plaintiffs still are
unable to have both.
Judge Straub and the DKT II court may respond by saying
that one should only look to the individual organization to
determine whether the restriction on the organization has been
remedied, without looking to the organization and its affiliate as a
whole. Under this approach, one could say that AOSI IV plaintiffs
are able to both remain neutral and conduct AIDS relief work with
government funds (albeit in a very limited sense, as the
organizations are required to maintain adequate separation from
the affiliate receiving Leadership Act funds).
The problem with this approach is that it creates a legal
fiction whereby the constitutional violation evaporates because it is
forced upon an affiliate organization. If the AOSI IV plaintiffs
accepted Leadership Act funds and pledged opposition to
prostitution and sex trafficking, could it reasonably be argued that
311. See Ullian, supra note 68, at 729, 735-36 (arguing that the adequate
alternative channels doctrine is not applicable to the Policy Requirement, and
that "the presumption of unconstitutionality remains"); Wentworth-Ping,
supra note 293, at 1143 (arguing that the affiliate organization structure in
AOSI does not save the Policy Requirement from unconstitutionality). But see
Cole Davis, Case Note, UnconstitutionalConditions: The Second CircuitSplits
with the D.C. Circuit and ErroneouslyFinds Anti-Prostitution Pledge Required
for HIV/AIDS Funding Unconstitutional, 65 SMU L. REv. 213, 218 (2012)
("[Tlhe recipients are free to form subsidiaries to accept the funds and adopt
the anti-prostitution pledge, while at the same time the parent organization
may maintain its neutral or even prop-prostitution views. The Act's guidelines
are the same as those that saved the restrictions in Rust and [TWR].").
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their constitutional rights have been restored when they create an
affiliate organization to remain silent and express neutrality on the
issue? It is difficult to see how the affiliate organization will have
changed the circumstances for the plaintiffs. If this hypothetical
suggests that the grantees would still be deprived of their speech
rights, why would the result be any different if it were the affiliate
organization bearing the burden of making the pledge in order to
receive Leadership Act funds? By focusing only on each individual
organization, the issue remains that the affiliate organization now is
having its constitutional rights violated. If the affiliate were to
subsequently bring suit, it could just as easily make the same
argument as the original AOSI plaintiffs - that the government
placed an unconstitutional condition on Leadership Act funds
through the Policy Requirement.
The Supreme Court should therefore pattern its adequate
alternative channels analysis after the A OSI IV court's application
of the test if it is to be consistent with the test's purpose of
protecting an organization's ability to communicate its message
effectively. 312 The AOSI IV court recognized that the Policy
Requirement was unlike the restriction in Rust because the
condition attached to the plaintiff organizations rather than to the
program-the nonprofits could not advocate for prostitution even
with wholly private funds. The court found the organizations to be
without adequate alternatives to express their views on prostitution
and sex trafficking, unlike the group in TWR.313 Regardless of the
ability to create an affiliate, the restriction would perpetuate
"organizations' inability to make known their views . . . without

incurring the unconstitutional penalty.' 3 14 Once a speaker is
compelled to convey a message, the creation of an affiliate to allow
him to speak contrary to that message cannot undo the effect of,
and thus does not cancel out, the message originally conveyed.1

312. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.

314. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 553
(1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
315. See Wentworth-Ping, supra note 293, at 1144 ("[T~he NGO [cannot]
disavow the Policy Requirement once it has been declared. The condition
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V. CONCLUSION
The circuit split over the constitutionality of the Policy
Requirement of the Leadership Act is understandable in light of
Court precedent regarding the
the opaque Supreme
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. While the AOSI IV court
reached the correct holding, the questionable reasoning it
employed by drawing a distinction between affirmative and
negative speech restrictions makes it unlikely that the Supreme
Court will adhere to its rationale. However, the Supreme Court can
and should explicitly adopt the adequate alternative channels test
used by the AOSI IV court. In so doing, the Court would provide
more certainty for when a speech restriction might rise to the level
of an unconstitutional condition. Invalidating the Policy
Requirement of the Leadership Act would not only be consistent
with Supreme Court precedent, but would also support policy
considerations for respecting the speech autonomy of charitable
nonprofit organizations.

obliging the recipients to speak taints any speech made by any other affiliate
organization.").

